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Governments fifty years from now will be both larger and smaller. The forces of nationalism make it too easy to be cynical and dismiss any broad-stroke attempt at world unification. But in the digital world, previously impossible solutions become viable." Systems that has evolved faster than any other medium associated with our daily lives. The computer and associated information exchange systems have gone from the stand alone personal device, to what was five years ago a new catch phrase, "network centric," to where we are today, "Global Centric" or the Global Information Grid (GIG). It is now possible for a small dedicated C2 cell in an otherwise unsophisticated organization to create a temporary knowledge-based advantage over a militarily superior force, which can be translated into a military advantage. In the area of Information Operations, one must assume that any adversary can attain some level of parity with friendly forces. It is because of this global link-up that now, more than ever, we must be clear on where we stand in providing the best possible information systems for our Army, the DoD and other local, state and federal agencies. We must do this while simultaneously protecting ourselves from those that would seek to do harm to our Information Operations infrastructure through Asymmetric Warfare.
WHAT IS INFORMATION OPERATIONS?:
Information Operations are those actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. This includes the use of psychological operations, deception, jamming, and computer network attack and defense. In today's Information age, the U.S. is clearly in the lead in developing and exploiting cutting edge information technology and all its inherent potential. Our economy, social and civil infrastructures, local, state and federal governments have all become dependent on real time rapid and accurate communications. Concurrently, we exercise extraordinary influence around the world through our immense media, commercial and entertainment industries. Conversely, the U.S. is affected by similar influences outside its borders. The Global Information Infrastructure (GII), which electronically links individuals and organizations around the world, is characterized by an ever growing merger of civilian and military information networks and technologies.
Simultaneously, most if not all military operations take place within the Global Information Environment (GIE) which is pervasive in its presence and influence on how we conduct day-today business. Current and emerging technologies can bring any military operation directly into the homes and offices of a global audience in real or near real time without the benefit of decoders or filters. With such easy access to national or global networks, suppression, control or censorship may not be realistic or desirable.
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As technology enables increasing numbers of individuals, organizations and nation states to be linked to the world through the GIE, these same players can be expected to eventually attempt to read, manipulate and control the content and flow of information contained within the Military Information Environment (MIE). These players and potential adversaries (in some cases current allies and some no doubt supported by non-friendly nation states) will seek to gain advantages in the GIE and MIE by employing battle space systems or any means at their disposal.
WHAT IS ASYMMETRIC WARFARE?:
Asymmetric Warfare is acting, thinking or organizing differently than the opponent in order to maximize one's own advantages or exploit an opponent's weakness. It comes from one force deploying new capabilities that the opponent force does not perceive or understand. It's conventional capabilities that counter or overmatch the capabilities of its opponent, or capabilities that represent totally new methods of attack or defense…or a combination of these 4 .
Asymmetric warfare on U.S. soil is not new. In King Philip's War (1675-1676), the New England Indians abandoned their traditional restraints and prepared to wage war against all colonists regardless of their status as innocent civilian or combatant. King Philip's method of attacking the normally larger British forces by using smaller, more mobile forces, taking advantage of terrain and using ambush tactics would be successful in the Indian Campaigns for the next 140 years. The British forces were slow to react opting instead to continue using their normal formations and massing their fires against an enemy that became increasingly harder to see.
Indians in the Southern plains disrupted American efforts in the West by turning the once held in awe American telegraph system against U.S. forces. By the early 1800s, the Apache Indians had studied and learned the function of the telegraph system. When preparing for war, they would cut the lines and remove sections or simply replace a smaller section of wire with rawhide so that it appeared to be intact. This historical example was the preview of things to come under the auspices of cyber attacks.
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FM 100-6 cites several other interesting historical perspectives regarding Information
Operations and early Asymmetric Warfare on the battlefield:
One of the earlier applications of Asymmetric C2 Warfare was demonstrated during the American Civil War. From the beginning, telegraph lines became an important target of cavalry raiding parties from both sides. Since the Union forces were more extensively equipped with telegraphic systems, they were more vulnerable. This vulnerability was exploited by Confederate troops. Among the more innovative soldiers were the telegraphers attached to Confederate cavalry commands. These specialists, who were also qualified as flagmen, rode in the lead as Confederate cavalry units raided Union territory. They switched military traffic to the wrong destinations, transmitted false orders to the headquarters of Union commanders, and cast suspicion upon all orders that came by wire. When they had finished the job, they cut all the wire in sight and took home with them as much as they could roll up in a hurry.
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Example 2.
In 1944, at the battle of Arnhem, the British First Airborne Division landed with the wrong radio crystals. They could not communicate with the outside, not even to their relief column at Nijmegen, a few miles away. They were isolated, under attack by superior numbers and surprised at being dropped where they were not supposed to be. During the entire multi-day battle, members of the Dutch resistance in Arnhem were routinely talking to their counterparts in Nijmegen by telephone, because the national telephone system had not been taken down. It never occurred to a single paratrooper to knock on the door of a house and call Nijmegen, because the battlefield had been defined outside the civilian infrastructure. The Dutch underground assumed the paratroopers were talking by radio, and paratroopers had never thought about using the civilian infrastructure.
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The Cyber threat now facing the U.S. is equally compelling and risks both the effectiveness of U. A National Coordinator, whose scope includes internal infrastructure as well as foreign terrorism and threats of domestic mass destruction.
The National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), located with and under the purview of the FBI, it brings together representatives of DoD, United States Secret Service (USSS), Energy, Transportation, the Intelligence Community and private sector in an unprecedented attempt at information sharing and quick resolution to major incidents.
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers, modeled after the Centers for Disease Control
and are set up by the private sector in cooperation with the federal government.
National Infrastructure Assurance Council, whose members are drawn from private sector leaders and local/state officials to provide guidance to the policy formulation of a National plan.
The National Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, which supports the National Coordinator's office along with government agencies and private sector in developing a national plan. PDD 63 is the culmination of a methodical, concentrated interagency effort to evaluate and ensure the security of the United States' increasingly vulnerable and interconnected infrastructures.
WHERE WE ARE TODAY:
The DoD's Information Operations mission is immense. In 1999, it was second only to Y2K in priority. Today it is DoD's top priority. At last count, the DoD had roughly 1.5 million desktop computers in its inventory. These computers combine to make up 20,000 Wide Area and Local Area Networks (W/LANs) of which 2,000 are considered critical to DoD's wide ranging missions. 10 Everything that occurs in a theater of operations is potentially subject to instantaneous scrutiny. Adversaries posture in hopes of causing reactions in the press without taking any real actions or risks. This can influence strategic decision makers and the direction, range and duration of operations by all involved.
We are the most studied military in the world. Foreign states have regular military features and even journals (such as the Russian Foreign Military Review) dedicated to the study and assessment of our military force structure, doctrine, operational concepts and capabilities.
Many of us have at one time or another even accessed Army field manuals and joint pubs from the Internet (some of the input for this SRP is a prime example). In April 2001, the Center for Army Lessons Learned recorded 5, 464 hits on its website from Europe and another 2, 015 hits on its website from Asia. These were merely seekers of information and not individuals out to do harm. However, attackers, viruses and hackers are an annoyance that come with the technology of computers, and the combination of all three along with other activities could seriously disrupt the Army's daily business processes and its ability to carry out its assigned missions.
Many readings suggest terrorists are increasing their use of commercial Information
Systems (INFOSYS) attacks. The terrorists' actions range from unauthorized access to using computer bulletin boards in order to pass intelligence and technical data across global borders.
Even Drug Cartels are taking advantage of the possibilities that are offered by Information Systems. For relatively low cost, these drug entrepreneurs can acquire the capability to strike from a distance their enemy's commercial, security and Information systems infrastructure while enjoying anonymity and safety.
Individuals with legitimate access to a system can pose the greatest threat by far and the most difficult one from which to defend. Whether recruited or self-motivated, the individual insider has access to systems normally protected against attack. While an insider can attack a system at almost any time, it is most vulnerable during design, production transport and maintenance.
On the battlefield, a maneuvering forces' dependence on an extensive and in some cases at outlining the future of warfighting. As such, it has dedicated an entire chapter to the discussion of Information Operations and the Information Environment. Chapter 11 points out that the value of Information Operations is not measured in how well it affects the transmission of enemy data, but rather how well it effects the outcome of the mission.
To be successful at Information Operations, leaders must understand its effects on the local population, local political leaders and displaced persons. This requires thorough IPB. This would include such tidbits as enemy capabilities, decision making styles and what information systems the enemy has at his/her disposal. It would also consider other areas such as the media, local attitudes, economy, demographics and personalities of those living in the Area of Operations.
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As with any Battlefield Operating System, the desired effects of Information Operations are to destroy, degrade, disrupt, deny, deceive, exploit and influence the enemy. Depth and simultaneous attack will enable the commander to directly influence the enemy throughout the width, height and depth of his battle space, to strike, then to rapidly defeat the enemy. By massing the effects of conventional fires and integrating Information Operations designed to blind, demoralize and defeat the enemy, concurrent with rapid combined arms ground and air maneuver, a larger and less agile enemy force can be quickly and decisively defeated.
The global visibility of operations impacts a command's combat power by either enhancing or degrading soldier morale. Soldier spirit and perseverance, the will to win and dedication to the cause and devotion to fellow soldiers and the unit can be rapidly undermined.
Bad news, misinterpretation and inaccurate information impact families and communities as well as soldiers, affecting their morale and commitment to the objective at hand and potentially undermining the critically important human dimensions.
is not a viable option, Information Operations can influence attitudes, reduce commitment to an enemy's cause and make it clear our willingness to use force without actually doing so.
Information Operations used this way could allow friendly forces to accomplish missions much faster with fewer casualties.
In a recent Washington Times article, William Hawkins, a National Security Senior Fellow at the U.S. Business and Industry Educational Foundation pointed out that terrorism and guerrilla warfare are asymmetric strategies that the U.S. has faced before. Those that are militarily weak but politically ambitious usually wage this kind of war. Mr. Hawkins singled out
Mao Tse-tung as one of the best modern day practitioners of guerrilla and asymmetric warfare.
This approach was the first phase in what would turn out to be a long protracted war pitting
Mao's Communist insurgents against the Nationalist Chinese Government. As the war dragged on, the Nationalist troops became more and more disillusioned and demoralized. As they weakened, Mao's troops gained strength and confidence, until they were able to gain ground from which to build a strong base to launch strikes at the heart of the enemy…its will.
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The fight for the future makes daily headlines. Information Operations in an asymmetric environment is proving difficult…but not insurmountable. The deep dynamic guiding current think tank analysis is that the information revolution favors the rise of network forms of organizations.
14 The rise of networks means that power is migrating to non-state actors, because they are able to organize into sprawling multinational networks. This implies that future conflicts will be increasingly waged by "networks" perhaps more than by hierarchal organizations. It also means that whoever masters the network stands to gain the advantage. Information Operations in an Asymmetric environment is not likely to be a passing fancy.
As the information revolution spreads and deepens around the world, instances of netwars will proliferate across the spectrum of conflict. So will the sophistication and the arsenal of techniques that different groups can muster. At present, the rise of netwars extends from the fact that the world system is in a turbulent, susceptible transition from the modern era, whose climax was reached at the end of the cold war to an era that is yet to be aptly named. Netwars, because of dependency on networks, is facilitated by the radical increases in global and transnational connectivity, as well as from the growing opportunities for increased connectivity from another sense…the ability of outsiders to gain access to each other and even for insiders to be secreted within an organization or sector of society.
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The established norm of behavior used to be that terrorists groups would announce their threats and rush to take credit for their actions. In this way, their existence and their objectives would be as widely known as possible. A new trend is for terrorists not to take responsibility for their actions. The destruction, killing or maiming of targets is sufficient to the cause. Eschewing responsibility also avoids the prospect of retaliation, as occurred with the United States bombing of Libya in 1986 in retaliation for the bombing attack on a German pub frequented by U.S.
soldiers. However, not taking credit does not necessarily avoid retaliation (as seen by the response to the September 11 th 2001 attacks). The trend to avoid responsibility only makes it more difficult to track terrorist organizations, to trace terrorists' acts and to bring those responsible to justice.
As for the United States and its friends and allies, one challenge will be to learn to network better with each other. Some of this is already going on in terms of intelligence sharing, but much more must be done to build a globally operational counterterrorist network. In terms of doctrine, the al-Qaeda network seems to have a grasp of the nonlinear nature of the battle space and of the value of attack from multiple directions by dispersed small units. If the attacks of September 11 th were indeed perpetrated by the al-Qaeda organization, its first campaign was no doubt the bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996, followed by a sharp shift to Terrorists aren't the only ones looking closely at the strategy of striking at American resolve. In their widely read 1999 book, "Unrestricted Warfare," Chinese Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui wrote, "Viewed from the performance of the U.S. military in Somalia, where they were at a loss when they encountered Aideed's forces, the most modern military force does not have the ability to control public clamor and cannot deal with an opponent who does things in an unconventional manner."
Indeed this is a key issue to ponder. However, there is one important fact that makes the Somali mission different from our War on Terrorism taking shape in Afghanistan...American resolve. Clear U.S. objectives and public support for the Somali mission were never fully developed. Americans were anxious to pull their young men and women out of harms way in a conflict they neither agreed with nor supported. Conversely, the terrorists' attacks of September 11 th took place on U.S. soil, was unprovoked and resulted in the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians. America's resolve appears to be steadfast. This could very well turn out to have been a gross miscalculation on the part of Bin Laden and the al Qaeda organization.
Yet interestingly enough, our unequaled use of air power in recent conflicts is seen by some as a superb asymmetrical warfare tool in the likes of guerrilla warfare. It is meant to weaken the enemy's will to resist the ground campaign, which will ultimately determine the outcome of the war. In Afghanistan, the Taliban's air defense system was rendered operationally combat ineffective early in the campaign. This gave U.S. troops the ability to strike when and where we wanted, conduct recon probes and airlift troops and supplies. The difference between winning and losing is the ability to impose the kind of political outcome that supports the nation's war aims.
The United States has made a point that the attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. One of the greatest challenges in countering asymmetric threats in the realm of Information Operations is that borders have become meaningless to anyone operating in a virtual world. Even if great diligence was taken in the effort to remove vulnerabilities, it would be almost impossible to eliminate them entirely because attack tools, networks and network control systems are in a constant state of evolution.
As new technologies develop so too will new attack tools and mechanisms. As a result, the Army will have to set procedures in place to allow security initiatives to evolve to deal with new threats as they arise.
In a resource limited environment, conscious decisions must be made as to where scarce resources should be allocated to manage the risk to the Army. This risk management/assessment approach must not only clearly understand the threat and vulnerabilities but the impact on trade-offs and solutions. Therefore, a balance of investment made in the three areas of people, operations and technology will allow the Army to get the best return on its dollars. What makes our investment in the Information Operations arena even more pressing is the Global Information Grid (GIG).
The GIG (as defined by ASD (C3I)) is a globally interconnected, end to end set of information capabilities, associated processes and personnel for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating and managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers and support personnel. The GIG not only serves the warfighter's needs for Information Superiority but also addresses the critical concerns of frequency spectrum and information infrastructure management.
The GIG is not just a combat tool, but also provides benefits and capabilities in the areas of logistics, computing services, communications, network operations and information management. The GIG is a constantly evolving entity as technologies, policies and capabilities are developed to take advantage of its vast potential. 
LAND INFORMATION WARFARE ACTIVITY:
The challenge for commanders in the 21 st Century is to operate effectively in a dynamic joint and multinational environment against a wide array of asymmetric threats. Maintaining the information high ground helps commanders meet that challenge. As full dimensional operations evolve, information and Information Operations become increasingly important to Army operations as the Army executes missions to deter conflict, to compel opponents, to reassure allies and friends and to provide domestic support. LIWA is electronically connected with other national, DoD, joint and service IW facilities.
LIWA has been specifically designed to provide tailored support to the land component commands. LIWA's purpose is to provide commanders with technical expertise that is not resident on the command's general and special staff and to provide responsive technical interfaces with other commands, service components and joint information centers. LIWA is the designated Army operational focal point and Army executive agent for Information Operations.
ENDS, WAYS & MEANS:
As with any strategy development, particularly at the strategic level, the development of ends, ways and means is important to ensure we are on path to the desired end state. The ends, ways and means outlined below focus on the areas of operations, people and technology as a possible answer to our success in future Information Operations and Asymmetric Warfare.
ENDS:
Provide in a secure fashion, the right information, at the right time and place for the right sources, in a form that users can understand and reliably use to accomplish their missions and tasks, effectively and efficiently.
WAYS:
Effective operational policies and doctrine. Build a framework to determine the value of information. Our military capabilities are heavily dependent on solid reliable and focused information. The value of information is a primary discriminator in Information Operations protection strategies that focus on priority targets. This strategy requires developing and applying knowledge and tools for helping to determine the value of information to missions and tasks. This approach will help reduce the over abundance of information and enable the Army and DoD to treat information as a commodity.
Defense in depth is the strategy that DoD is pursuing to ensure success in both cyber warfare and other types of warfare that are dependent on Information Operations. Critical to the Army's ability to conduct warfare, Information Operations is the accepted responsibility of all modern warfighters. Because of the universal nature of the GIG, a risk assumed by anyone at any level is a risk assumed by all. Therefore, Information Operations is necessary at all levels.
Through a structured and deliberate risk analysis process, Army leaders can make effective risk management decisions on how to counter enemy Information Operations measures in an asymmetric environment. The target for networks includes data, voice, wireless (pages and cellular) and tactical networks that support both operational and strategic missions. Again, these networks can be both Army (DoD) owned and operated or provided through leased lines.
Tactics used to defend these networks and infrastructures include the use of multiple and redundant data paths to allow more than one available alternative physical route for data Both the Goodlatte and the McCain bills permit the unregulated export of strong encryption technologies within the very near future. However, neither bill sufficiently resolves the national security and public safety issues raised by the unregulated export and proliferation of strong encryption products.
THE FUTURE:
The Cyber battlefield is real. It's a place where computers are used instead of guns, data packets instead of bullets, and firewalls are used instead of barbed wire. Those that are still mired in fighting another "Desert Storm" or want to continue to live in the comfortable past of a largely bi-polar, superpower driven global situation may be in for a rude awakening as the nature of asymmetric conflict unfolds in the coming decade. There are few, if any countries that can militarily challenge the U.S. in open combat at the present time. Some seemingly astute assessments would suggest that China may become a future adversary with the industrial and conventional military power to eventually confront the U.S. and her allies, but they also point out that this capability is still evolving and that it may take China a minimum of three to five years or more to become a major threat to the United States and overall world stability.
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The future holds both opportunity and challenge for us regarding Information Operations and Asymmetric Warfare. Developing and fielding the right force mix in the face of continued technological advantages is clearly a monumental challenge. We must focus our energies on developing a Full Spectrum capability. As such, increasing our dependence on electronic and computer systems for managing the fight will move even more combat situations into the Information Operations environment.
The DoD policies and procedures currently in place are clearly taking us in the direction we need to go in regarding Information Operations for the first part of the 21 st Century and up through 2015. At the same time we must be forever mindful that today's globalization of systems and networks creates a new dimension for warfare. The adversary can be a lone hacker either out for a thrill or with a grudge against the U.S. The new warfighter must become tomorrow's Cyber Warrior with the prerequisite technical and non-traditional skill sets required.
The literature regarding Information Operations in an asymmetric environment offers some interesting insights into our struggle with al-Qaeda and the conduct of our first major conflict of the millennium. Al-Qaeda seems to hold the advantage at the social and doctrinal levels and apparently in the organizational domain as well. For the United States and its allies, there is much room for improvement…most at the organizational and doctrinal levels. Simply put, the United States and its allies must build its own networks and learn to swarm the enemy in order to keep it on the run and pinned down until it can be destroyed. The United States and its allies must also seize the initiative including applying pressure on any states that harbor terrorists. To be sure, the real work needs to be done in developing an innovative concept of operations and building the right kinds of networks to carry off a swarming campaign against networked terrorists. For at its heart, Information Operations and Asymmetric Warfare are far more about organization and doctrine than about technology.
In less than one generation, our nation has experienced a profound transformation. The information revolution and the introduction of the computer into virtually every dimension of our society has changed how our economy works, how we provide for our national security and how we structure our everyday lives. New advancements in information systems technologies have given us limitless new possibilities for learning and creating, increasing the safety of our families and communities and building a new era of prosperity.
Yet, this new age of promise carries with it peril. Whether we are simply turning on the lights in our homes, boarding a plane or summoning help for a family member who has fallen ill, we are relying on one or more elaborate computer driven systems. Similarly, many of our most critical defense systems rely on commercial power, communications and transportation. All these systems are vulnerable to intrusion and destruction. Indeed, those who seek to challenge us may now prefer to attack these computer based systems rather than face us on the battlefield where America has an overwhelming preponderance of forces. Where once our opponents relied exclusively on bombs and bullets, hostile powers and terrorists can now turn a laptop computer into a weapon capable of doing enormous damage. If we are to continue to enjoy the benefits of the Information Age, preserve our security and safeguard our economic well-being, we must protect our critical computer-controlled systems from attack.
SUMMARY:
Information Operations has emerged as a critical component of the Army's operational readiness, providing the means to detect, react, restore and deter intrusions or attacks from the outside or from within. Today we stand ready to handle the brunt of these Asymmetric attacks.
However, Information Operation challenges still remain. The primary one is for the U.S. and specifically our military to be able to keep pace with rapidly evolving technologies. Related to this challenge is the need to keep personnel current with the new technologies and understanding them enough to be able to defend against threat initiatives. While technology will be critical to achieving greater operational agility and precision lethality, the human dimension of war will also take on increased importance. The soldier will remain the centerpiece of Army formations, and as the complexity of operations increases, well-trained disciplined soldiers and of course leaders will become ever more important. 
